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INTRODUCTION
This Article shows the limits of the highly ideological U.S. debate
on consumer bankruptcy and challenges the wisdom of both the
progressive and law-and-economics bodies of scholarship. In particular,
the study employs a descriptive analysis of consumer bankruptcy
discharge informed by behavioral law-and-economics methodology in
order to show how bankruptcy shapes debtors’ behaviors. This Article
argues that bankruptcy discharge, traditionally regarded in common law
legal systems as a pro-debtors remedy, in its most liberal extension,
instead becomes a powerful incentive toward over-indebtedness and
therefore, a profitable legal device for financial institutions.
Further, this Article argues that civil law legal systems, which are
typically considered pro-creditor due to their much stricter approach
toward consumer debt, present an opposite picture: a much less-indebted
middle class and a less fertile soil for creditors. By demonstrating the
paradoxical effects of the common law and civil law approaches to
consumer debt, this Article challenges the traditional wisdom according
to which the civil law tradition—based on the “universal patrimonial
liability” rule for debtors—is purely a pro-creditor system while the
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common law tradition—faithful to a liberal notion of bankruptcy
discharge—is a pro-debtor one.
This assertion lays the foundation for a new normative analysis of
bankruptcy discharge that suggests that in order to truly protect debtors,
contrary to traditional progressive ideas, it is necessary to adopt a less
paternalistic approach that considers the incentives that bankruptcy
discharge poses to debtors. This ex ante perspective, different from the
one supported by law-and-economics scholarship, arrives at the
conclusion that in order to ultimately make debtors safer, it is necessary
to tighten access to bankruptcy discharge and restore the mechanism’s
original founding principle of protecting only the honest but unfortunate
debtor, not any over-indebted individual.
This analysis is organized as follows. Part I illustrates the recent
global trends in consumer bankruptcy, particularly, the tendency of civil
law legal systems to move toward the common law model through the
liberalization of discharge of consumer debt. Part II describes the
historical evolution of bankruptcy discharge in both England and the
United States, and points out the fact that the civil law tradition has
taken a different course of development for debtors’ liability compared
to the direction followed by common law legal systems. Part III shows
how the rationale behind discharge has dramatically changed in
twentieth-century American bankruptcy law. Part IV illustrates the U.S.
debate on the scope of discharge and offers an alternative descriptive
analysis based on the results of a behavioral law-and-economics
analysis. Lastly, Part V proposes a new normative analysis of discharge
that departs from both the progressive and conservative scholarly
discourse in the United States.
I. RECENT TRENDS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
A. THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
In the last three decades, several countries belonging to different
legal traditions have encouraged the liberalization of consumer
bankruptcy by introducing the discharge of consumer debt.2 This trend3
2. In general terms, discharge is the legal elimination of a debt through
bankruptcy proceedings. After a discharge is granted, a debt is no longer legally
enforceable against the debtor. See Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in
Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 56, 56 (1990) [hereinafter Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start]. A useful survey of

296

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

finds its immediate explanation in the explosion of consumer credit and
runs opposite to the pattern in the United States, traditionally the most
liberal country in its attitude toward discharge.
This
“democratization”—or using more honest terms, “deregulation”—of
credit has typically been singled out as the reason behind the recent
global trends in consumer bankruptcy discharge.4
Particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States and
U.K. under the Clinton and Blair administrations, respectively, eased
access to consumer credit through deregulation.5 In order to maximize
debtors’ liability regimes in different legal systems is offered by Rafael Efrat, Global
Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 passim (2002) [hereinafter
Efrat, Global Trends]; CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY – COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1 passim (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009); see also Iain
Ramsay, Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market: Approaches to Debt
Adjustment and Consumer Insolvency in the EU, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN
EUROPE – DIFFERENT PATHS FOR DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 5 passim (Robert Anderson
et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Ramsay, Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market].
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See infra Part I.B.
The United States emerged from the war with unparalleled
prosperity and hardly needed further savings campaigns. Instead
politicians, businessmen and labor leaders all promoted consumption
as the new driver of economic growth. Rather than democratize
saving, the American system rapidly democratized credit. An array
of federal housing and tax policies enabled Americans to borrow to
buy homes and products as no other people could. But from the
1980s, financial deregulation and new tax legislation spurred the
growth of credit cards, home equity loans, subprime mortgages and
predatory lending. Soaring home prices emboldened the financial
industry to make housing and consumer loans that many Americans
could no longer repay. Still, Americans wondered, why save when it
is so easy to borrow? Only after housing prices collapsed in 2008 did
they discover that wealth on paper is not the same as money in the
bank.
Sheldon Garon, Why We Spend, Why They Save, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, at A35.
5. In particular, the U.S. Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999, which repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The U.K. passed
the Financial Services (Open-Ended Investment Companies Act) Regulation in 1997
and the Enterprise Act in 2002. For more on the strong connection between neo-liberal
economic theories, the exponential growth of finance, and the deregulation of the
consumer credit market, see LARRY ELLIOT & DAN ATKINSON, THE GODS THAT FAILED
– HOW BLIND FAITH IN MARKETS HAS COST US OUR FUTURE 1 passim (2009); DAVID
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welfare, these two countries strongly embraced the ideas that high
consumption drives economic growth and that consequently, risk-taking
and consumer debt must be spurred even among low-income
borrowers—ideas exemplified by the expansion of subprime lending.6

HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM 1 passim (2007); see also Ramsay,
Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market, supra note 2.
6. See Iain Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’: The Construction of
Overindebtedness in the UK, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY –
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 75, 77–78, 84 (Johanna Niemi et al.
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’]. The spread
in emerging markets of an economic growth model based on high consumption by
lower-income classes is shown in the case of Brazil, where between 2000 and 2007 the
number of credit cards increased from 119 million to 413 million. See Cláudia LimaMarques & Antônio Benjamin, Consumer Overindebtedness in Brazil and the Need for
the New Consumer Bankruptcy Legislation, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT &
BANKRUPTCY – COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 57, 60–61
(Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009) (describing the first decade of the 21st century as a “a
‘credit hangover’ period, a time when these ‘new’ and poorer consumers cannot afford
to pay their own debts, but they are still in the bank and credit card system as solvent
clients”).
Our economy depends on consumer spending. Our economists take
inconsistent positions about whether the spending is good or bad.
They demand that people save more to increase capital investment
and productivity at the same time they warn that increased
consumption is essential to economic growth. In short, they want
more spending and more savings. They are apparently too busy to
explain how to do both of these at the same time, especially when
incomes are stagnant. One thing Americans can do on the
consumption side, despite their stagnant incomes, is to incur more
debt.
Many people have an enormous economic stake in
encouraging us to do just that. No one, it seems, has an interest in
providing sober reminders about the risks involved. Adding to these
general trends is the growth of a whole new segment of the
consumer credit industry . . . . The new segment is concentrated on
the very consumers who were feared and avoided by credit granters
just a few years ago. They are people at the margins who already
have high consumer debts in relationship to their incomes. So called
subprime lending – that is, lending to people who have spotty credit
histories or are awash in debt – is the most profitable, and hence the
most rapidly increasing, segment of consumer lending.
TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS – AMERICANS IN DEBT 23–24
(2000). On the functioning of subprime lending markets, see Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction
by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics
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This highly suggestive idea, which has collapsed during the
financial crisis of 2008, has deeply influenced financial policies around
the globe, triggering a competition among different legal systems to
introduce consumption-stimulating measures.7 The resultant climate,
characterized by a shortsighted trust in the ability of consumer credit to
promote economic growth, is undoubtedly reflected in E.U. regulation
“on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive
87/102/EEC.”8 This European Directive is strongly inspired by the idea
that having access to a good deal of information before concluding a
financial agreement is enough to guarantee “responsible” credit.9 The
regulation, which focuses on the supply side of the consumer credit
market while neglecting consumers’ protection, fully relies upon market
dynamics in order to prevent “bad” credit.10 Several European countries
and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1073
(2009).
7. A clear illustration of the influence exercised by the U.S. and U.K. models of
consumer credit on continental Europe is provided by the Italian doctrinal debate on the
opportunity to introduce bankruptcy discharge, which is seen by some authors as a tool
to spur consumption and consumer credit. In fact, some Italian scholars have argued
that the low indebtedness of Italian families compared to those in the U.K. is a
symptom of Italian economic stagnation. See L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE
DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA LIBERAZIONE, in ANALISI GIURIDICA DELL’ECONOMIA 299 passim
(Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004). In particular, see Lorenzo Stanghellini, ‘Fresh Start’:
implicazioni di ‘policy’, in L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA
LIBERAZIONE 437, 440 n.4 (Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that considering
“the current and expected trend of consumer credit growth, it is not an exaggeration to
state that Italian economy relies on the expansion of this sector in order to develop.
This very same conclusion has been reached, with a good deal of realism, by the
legislators of other countries, as the United Kingdom, which among the reasons of its
recent reform . . . introduced the need to stimulate consumption, which there as in other
countries relies for a substantial portion on credit”).
8. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTIVE 2008/48/EC (Apr. 23, 2008); see Ramsay,
Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market, supra note 2, at 6 (“The treatment of
over-indebtedness is one part of consumer credit regulation policy which straddles
economic and social policy. The EU promotes consumer credit as ‘the lubricant of
economic life’ within the context of a ‘competitive social market economy.’ The
development of debt adjustment systems and insolvency is part of the constitution of
this market. The EU has thus far focused more on creating a competitive credit market
than addressing its social costs, perhaps reflecting the influence of neo-liberal ideas and
financial interests in credit policymaking within the EU.”).
9. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTIVE 87/102/EEC, recitals 24 and 26.
10. On the EU Consumer Credit Directive, see Udo Reifner, ‘A Call to Arms’ –
For Regulation of Consumer Lending, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY –
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have also examined the bankruptcy discharge of consumer debt with
respect to the demand side of the consumer credit market to further
encourage the use of credit.11

COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 114–15 (Johanna Niemi et al.
eds., 2009) (“For the EU regulator, only the market can define what is good and detect
what consumers need. . . . The mere fact that people are overindebted proves that the
credit was ‘bad’ for them.”). The approach of European institutions to consumer credit
can be cited as a tangible demonstration of the recent European trend of distancing
itself from its original, more paternalistic approach aimed at protecting consumers’
interests in areas such as product safety and quality. More recently, European
institutions seem more sensitive to guaranteeing the economic interest of consumers
(i.e., purchasing goods at the lowest price). On the abdication of the European model
and the dominance of the North American model, see VICTORIA DE GRAZIA,
IRRESISTIBLE EMPIRE – AMERICA’S ADVANCE THROUGH TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE
1 passim (2005).
Germany and France, I will argue, remain far more oriented toward
producer and distributor interests . . . than the United States, even in
this high age of consumerism. . . . Continental law is indeed putting
a growing emphasis on the consumer protection interest, developing
many paternalistic guarantees of the safety and quality of goods and
services. But the consumer economic interest is making slower
headway. The result, as I will try to show, is that contemporary
continental law can leave many producer protections on the books.
See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism v. Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law,
117 YALE L.J. 340, 348 (2007). The author later clarifies his terminology:
Let us begin with the ambiguities of “consumer interests.” On the
one hand, when we speak of ‘the interest of consumers,’ we may be
speaking of consumer economic interests, i.e., of the interest of
consumers in purchasing goods and services at the lowest possible
price, in having access to the widest variety of goods and services, in
having easy access to credit, in being able to shop at maximally
convenient hours and locations, and the like. On the other hand,
when we speak of ‘protecting the interest of consumers,’ we may be
speaking of consumer protection and safety legislation, that is,
legislation on such matters as products liability, the purity of food
and drugs, nondeceptive advertising, and the like.
Id. at 366–67.
11. See infra Part V.B.
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B. OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
In keeping the idea that favoring consumption through extensive
access to credit is socially desirable, over the last several decades,
several civil law countries have begun to view the common law
approach to consumer bankruptcy as a viable tool to spur consumption,
questioning the efficiency of their regimes in governing individuals’
liability toward creditors.12
Traditionally in civil law legal systems, an individual is liable for
his obligations with all his assets.13 In particular, the default rule
governing relations between debtors and creditors is that all of a person’s
property (his entire present and future patrimony) is available for seizure
and sale to satisfy the claims of creditors (so-called “universal patrimonial
liability”).14 Furthermore, in the civil law tradition consumer debts are
typically excluded from bankruptcy law. Therefore, discharge is not
granted to individuals whose debts are not related to an entrepreneurial
activity.15
The universal patrimonial liability regime governing consumer
debt, which stands in clear contrast to the consumer bankruptcy
discharge regimes of common law systems, has recently been viewed as
one of the reasons for low indebtedness, low consumption, and
consequently, following the rationale of the so-called “consumer

12.
13.

See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
See Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and Convergences of Common Law
and Civil Law Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis, 12 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 517, 525 (2010).
14. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 525. The principle of “universal
patrimonial liability” was first introduced in modern codifications by Article 2092 of
the French Code Napoléon of 1804 (“Quiconque s’est obligé personnellement, est tenu
de remplir son engagement sur tous ses biens mobiliers et immobiliers, présents et à
venir.”). The same principle can be found nowadays in many civil codes, including the
Italian Civil Code and Civil Code of Québec. See Art. 2740 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.)
(“The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his present and future assets.”);
CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2644 (Can.) (“The property of a debtor is
charged with the performance of his obligations and is the common pledge of creditors.”);
CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2645 (Can.) (“Any person under a
personal obligation charges, for its performance, all his property, movable and
immovable, present and future . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., ITALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW, Royal Decree No. 267 (Mar. 16, 1942)
where at art. 1, ¶ 1 it is stated: “Are subject to the provisions of bankruptcy law . . .
entrepreneurs that carry on a commercial activity. . . .”
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economy,”16 slow economic growth among European countries.17 In
fact, the severe regime toward debtors’ liability typical of the civil law
tradition has been blamed for making individuals more risk-averse and
less willing to incur debt than they would under existing bankruptcy law
in common law systems.18
Based on this assumption, several
countries—even those with a strong culture of saving19—have thought it
16. For a criticism of economic theories relying on consumption and indebtedness
as tools to achieve economic growth see CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF,
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY passim (2009). For a
critical sociological examination of the “consumer economy,” see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN,
CONSUMING LIFE 1 passim (2007).
17. See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at 443.
18. A typical example of this rhetoric can be found in the Italian doctrinal debate
on the opportunity to introduce consumer discharge. See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at
443:

On the other hand, a strong pressure and/or an afflictive regime
imposed on an insolvent debtor can persuade a person evaluating
whether to take on debt not to do it and this is capable of resulting in
a contraction of consumptions . . . and in a reduction of propensity to
take risks, together with a loss for society both in terms of a
reduction of social welfare and a reduction of entrepreneurial
initiatives . . . . The prospect of a perpetual liability . . . is capable of
producing a loss for society considering that an insolvent debtor will
refrain from engaging in profitable activities and, at the same time,
creditors will not gain any benefit from this abstention.
See also Riccardo Brogi, Bilancio e indebitamento delle famiglie italiane,
L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA LIBERAZIONE 265, 280
(Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004). According to this author, regulating consumer
discharge is a fundamental measure necessary to fill the gap that separates Italy from
countries like the U.K. which the author considers, at least until the financial crisis of
2008, more efficient.
19. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007 Italian household debt
relative to GDP was 48% as compared to 99.5% of U.S. households and 110.2% of
U.K. households. See Pietro Reichlin, I vizi e le virtù (nascoste) del debito, IL SOLE 24
ORE (Feb. 21, 2010), available at http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/
dossier/Italia/2009/commenti-sole-24-ore/21-febbraio-2010/vizi-virtu-nscostedebito_PRN.shtml. Furthermore, in 2008, the Italian debt to income ratio was 45.3%,
BANCA D’ITALIA, SUPPLEMENTO AL BOLLETTINO STATISTICO – I BILANCI DELLE
FAMIGLIE ITALIANE NEL (2008), available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/
indcamp/bilfait/boll_stat/suppl_08_10_corr.pdf; and increased to 66% in 2011, BANCA
D’ITALIA, BOLLETTINO ECONOMICO NUMERO 67 GENNAIO (2012), available at
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/bollec/2012/bolleco67/bollec67/boleco_
67.pdf. In the U.K., however, it was 152% in 2007, SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB ET AL.,
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suitable to reform this liability regime and introduce discharge of
consumer debt to boost debt propensity and, consequently,
consumption.20
Undoubtedly, as American scholars have unanimously pointed,
there is a strict correlation between consumer bankruptcy, household
over-indebtedness and consumer credit.21 Nevertheless, the U.S. debate
Disclosure as an Imperfect Means for Addressing Overindebtedness: An Empirical
Assessment of Competitive Approaches, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY –
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 156 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds.,
2009); and 155.4 % in 2011, US, UK Households Start Reducing Their Debt Burdens,
FIRSTPOST, (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.firstpost.com/world/us-uk-households-startreducing-their-debt-burdens-91146.html. According to Garon, “[o]ver the past three
decades, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium have maintained household saving
rates between 10 and 13 percent, and rates in Sweden recently soared to 13 percent. By
contrast, saving rates in the United States dropped to nearly zero by 2005; they rose
above 5 percent after the 2008 crisis but have recently fallen below 4 percent.” See
Garon, supra note 4, at A35.
20. With regard to continental Europe, a very significant development has been the
introduction of consumer discharge in France and Germany, which had traditionally
adopted a “universal patrimonial liability” regime. In France, consumer bankruptcy
was first introduced by Law No. 89-1010 of December 31, 1989 regarding “la
prévention et au règlement des difficultés liées au surendettement des particuliers et des
familles.” This law was subsequently repealed by Decree No. 2004-180 of February
24, 2004 (recently amended by Law No. 2010-737 of July 1 2010 and by Decree No.
2010-1304 of October 29, 2010) regarding “la procédure de traitement des situations de
surendettement des particuliers et modifiant le titre III du livre III du code de la
consummation.” The latter decree has been included in the Code de la Consommation
(Titre III of the Livre III). In Germany, consumer discharge (Insolvenzordnung) was
regulated by Gesetz, October 5, 1994, BGBl.I S. 2866, recently amended by Gesetz,
December 9, 2010, BGBl I S. 1885. Greece adopted its first consumer and small
business bankruptcy law in 2010 (Law No. 3869/2010). In Italy, consumer bankruptcy
was regulated for the first time by Law No. 3 of January 27, 2012, which was later
amended by Law Decree No. 179 of October 18, 2012 (later amended by Law No. 221
of December 17, 2012).
21. In the United States between 1979, the year following the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, and 2004, consumer bankruptcy filings rose from 250,000 to
1.5 million. See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy
Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2005). From 1945 to 1970, consumer bankruptcy
filings climbed from 11,051 to 178,202. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION –
A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 136–37 (2001) [hereinafter SKEEL,
DEBT’S DOMINION]. This increase has been explained as a direct consequence of the
expansion of consumer credit, which was particularly encouraged by the introduction of
credit cards in the sixties. In fact, in the same period, consumer debt expanded from
$30 billion in 1945 to $569 billion in 1974. See Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit
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on consumer bankruptcy has become polarized22 with strong ideological
positions on either side regarding the cause-and-effect relationship of
consumer bankruptcy and consumer credit.23 Pro-debtor scholars (the
“progressive bankruptcy scholarship”)24 maintain that creditors and their
predatory techniques must be blamed for household over-indebtedness
and the consequential rise in consumer bankruptcy filings while procreditor scholars (the “conservative bankruptcy scholarship”)25 insist
that the ease in obtaining discharge makes individuals opportunistically
willing to incur more debt, which in turn, causes lenders to ration credit
and demand more collateral.26 The debtor-oriented approach reasons
that ensuring easy access to discharge is a necessary remedy for overindebted U.S. consumers. On the other hand, the creditor-oriented
approach strongly supports the idea of making bankruptcy laws stricter
in order to limit debtors’ strategic behavior and make consumer credit
more efficient.27 It is worth noticing how these two schools of thought
adopt opposite perspectives. While the former appeals to an ex post
reasoning, viewing discharge as a last-resort remedy to overindebtedness, the latter takes an ex ante approach, arguing that the
restriction of discharge would establish the correct incentives for
debtors, thereby making credit more available and cheaper.28
Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975). The correlation
between bankruptcy and consumer debt is also stressed in RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING
AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS AROUND THE
WORLD 60–72 (2006); Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 347, 348 (2007); Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1373–74,
1413; and SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 129. The financial literature agrees upon a
correlation between credit card usage and consumer bankruptcy. See Ian Domowitz &
Robert Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403
(1999). On the expansion of consumer credit in the United States, see LENDOL CALDER,
FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 1
passim (2001).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. The ideological character of the consumer bankruptcy debate in the United
States is described by SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 187–211.
24. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and
Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000) [hereinafter
Skeel, Progressive Bankruptcy Scholarship].
25. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 200 (referring to this
scholarship as “law-and-economics scholarship”).
26. On the different theories of pro-debtor and pro-creditor scholars, see infra Part
IV.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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The recent global trends in personal bankruptcy policy—in
particular, the European tendency to introduce discharge of consumer
debt—represents a unique opportunity to have a second and deeper look
at bankruptcy discharge to assess the effectiveness of the American
debate on this topic. In fact, as it has been shown, the idea behind the
liberalization of discharge practices in Europe is to make individuals
more willing to incur debt, and therefore expand the consumer credit
supply. Unlike the American progressive bankruptcy scholarship, the
European approach does not treat discharge as a remedy for consumers’
over-indebtedness, but instead adopts an ex ante perspective, regarding
it as a way to encourage consumers to take on more debt. Meanwhile, it
parts ways with the American conservative bankruptcy scholarship in
contending that discharge will provoke the expansion, not rationing, of
credit.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
In order to solve this puzzle as to whether discharge is a last resort
to protect debtors or a powerful tool to encourage risk-taking behavior,
one must understand the original rationale for bankruptcy discharge by
exploring its historical evolution.
A. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
1. England: The Emergence of Bankruptcy Discharge
In the thirteenth century, England passed a statute to introduce the
measure of imprisonment for debtors in default.29 In order to promote
commerce, which was highly dependent on credit, such coercive
imprisonment was considered to be a fundamental tool to protect

29. In particular, imprisonment for debt was introduced by the Statute of
Marlbridge of 1267. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its
Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL. HIST. 153, 154
(1982); See also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1919). In early Roman law, the Law of the Twelve Tables
provided for the physical punishment of an insolvent debtor and also the possibility of
apportioning the debtor’s body to creditors. See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of
Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 364, 373 (2006) [hereinafter Efrat,
Bankruptcy Stigma].
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creditors’ interests.30 Mere default was sufficient to detain the debtor.
The law did not distinguish between defaulting debtors who were
solvent and therefore perceived as fraudulent, and those who were
honest but unfortunate, insolvent debtors.31
The first English bankruptcy laws of the sixteenth century were
specifically conceived to protect those creditors who were willing to
finance the risky adventures of the emerging English middle class:
merchants and traders engaging in mercantile activities.32 In fact, the
earliest bankruptcy proceedings were confined to merchants and traders
and not debtors whose obligations originated from different activities.
The proceedings were conceived not to relieve debtors but for the
exclusive purpose of protecting creditors from fraudulent debtor conduct
and payment evasion.33
Only in the early 1700s did the idea of incentivizing the most
dynamic sector of English society (traders and merchants) find its way
into the political agenda.34 Among the incentives aimed at increasing
entrepreneurship and risk-taking was bankruptcy discharge.35 Since the
possibility of incorporating an organization was not generally admitted
as a way of limiting debtors’ liability, discharge was used as an
alternative legal device to achieve a functionally equivalent outcome.36
Two fundamental elements characterized the original rationale
behind discharge in the eighteenth century. First, a basic distinction was
30.
31.

Cohen, supra note 29, at 154–55.
Id. at 157; see also MICHAEL QUILTER, The Quality of Mercy - The Merchant of
Venice in the Context of the Contemporary Debt and Bankruptcy Law of England, 6
INSOLV. L. J. 43, 45 (1998).
32. For an overview of the historical evolution of English bankruptcy law, see Ian
P. H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1980).
33. Both the Bankruptcy Act of 1542 and that of 1570 (An Act Touching Orders
for Bankrupts) were enacted with the specific purpose of curbing debtors’ ability to
defraud creditors. See Cohen, supra note 29, at 155–56.
34. Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 325, 335 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the
Bankruptcy Discharge].
35. See id.
36. Id.; see also Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 100; CHARLES J.
TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 68 (1997) [hereinafter TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY];
Thomas J. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1400 (1985); Cohen, supra note 29, at 160–62. Discharge is viewed as a means to spur
commercial enterprise. See Efrat, Global Trends, supra note 2, at 81 (“Since
entrepreneurs generally face a higher risk of financial failure as compared to wage
earners, a broad fresh start policy in bankruptcy provides a necessary cushion to
accommodate their increased financial vulnerability.”).
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made between fraudulent traders and merchants and honest traders and
merchants who were victims of unavoidable misfortunes related to their
highly risky activities.37 Therefore, bankruptcy discharge was suggested
as a means of relief for the latter group that experienced financial
distress because of exogenous events.38
Second, only traders and merchants were included within the scope
of bankruptcy laws.39 Since discharge was available only through a
bankruptcy proceeding, non-trading debtors were unable to benefit from
it.40 Any debt that was not assumed for a commercial enterprise was
perceived as unreasonable and morally unacceptable.41
37.
38.
39.

Duffy, supra note 32, at 286–87.
See id.
Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at

334–35.
40. See id.
41. See id. The reasons lying behind the restriction of bankruptcy laws to traders
and merchants are explained in exemplary fashion by William Blackstone:
A bankrupt was before defined ‘a trader who secretes himself, or
does certain other acts, tending to defraud his creditors.’ He was
formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal or offender; . . .
But at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws
calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of
humanity as well as justice; and to that end they confer some
privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or
debtor himself. The laws of England . . . are cautious of encouraging
prodigality and extravagance by this indulgence to debtors; and
therefore they allow the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none
but actual traders; since that set of men are, generally speaking, the
only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying
their debts, without any fault of their own. If persons in other
situations of life run in debt without the power of payment, they
must take the consequences of their own indiscretion, even though
they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their fortunes: for
the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a
trader to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value. If
a gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at the time of contracting
his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them, the delay of payment is a
species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his creditor: and
if, at such time, he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and
injustice is the greater. He cannot therefore murmur, if he suffers the
punishment which he has voluntarily drawn upon himself. But in
mercantile transactions the case is far otherwise. Trade cannot be
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In this cultural and economic context at the outset of the eighteenth
century, the proposal to introduce bankruptcy discharge for those
unfortunate but honest and cooperative traders and merchants was first
accepted and regulated by the Act of 1705.42 Meanwhile, imprisonment
remained the rule for non-trading debtors in default until 1869.43
The Act of 1705 represents a fundamental stage in the evolution of
bankruptcy law.44 This law was framed to distinguish among different
categories of debtors, taking into consideration both the human
vicissitudes lying behind the financial distress in question (fraudulent as
opposed to honest but unfortunate debtors) and the activity responsible
for the incurred debt (traders and merchants as opposed to non-trading
debtors).45 While sixteenth and seventeenth century bankruptcy law was
conceived as a purely pro-creditor device and reserved only for traders
and merchants who were thought to be more inclined to defraud
creditors, in the eighteenth century, bankruptcy law started appreciating,
carried on without mutual credit on both sides: the contracting of
debts is therefore here not only justifiable but necessary. And if by
accidental calamities, as by loss of a ship in a tempest, the failure of
brother traders, or by the nonpayment of persons out of trade, a
merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own debts,
it is his misfortune and not his fault.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 473–75 (1765).
42. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts (4 & 5 Anne c.
17) is the name of the Act of 1705 that first introduced the practice of bankruptcy
discharge. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 333–34 (pointing out the fact that discharge was not automatic, but was
considered a judicial act within the discretion of the bankruptcy commissioners).
43. Cohen, supra note 29, at 155–57, 162–64; see also PETER J. COLEMAN,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, 7, n.8 (1974) (“If a man be taken in execution, and lie in
prison for debt, neither the plaintiff, at whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who
took him, is bound to find him meat, drink, or clothes; but he must live on his own, or
on the charity of others; and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name of God,
says the law; and so say I.”) (quoting Judge Robert Hyde).
44. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 333.
45. See id. at 338; Levinthal, supra note 29, at 18–19 (regarding traders and
merchants, “[t]he discharge was the result of the gradual realization of the fact that in
many cases the bankruptcy might be properly an object of pity”); BLACKSTONE, supra
note 41, at 471–72 (pointing out, in a perspective that would be defined today as in
accordance with law and economics, the benefit to society of eliminating the prior debts
of a trader so that he “by the assistance of his allowance and his own industry, may
become a useful member of the commonwealth”).
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through the benefit of bankruptcy discharge, the social value of those
groups who were willing to challenge the uncertainties of mercantile
activity in order to increase both their own welfare and the social
welfare.46 This shift in the collective perception of traders and
merchants triggered a process of transformation in bankruptcy law from
a purely creditor-oriented remedy to a pro-debtor one that emphasized
risk-taking, debtors’ cooperation during the bankruptcy proceeding, and
restoring debtors to a productive economic cycle.
In sum, honesty and being the unfortunate victim of an exogenous
event are the two fundamental elements that, in the eighteenth century,
justified the introduction of discharge and the loosening of creditors’
influence in managing the financial distress of their debtors.47
2. The United States: From the Origins Through the Nineteenth
Century Pro-Debtor Approach
Notwithstanding the U.S. Constitution of 1787, which includes a
bankruptcy clause that allows Congress to legislate at a federal level,48
in the late eighteenth century, this federal power was not exercised.49
Yet, several states passed laws to grant debtors some sort of relief.50
The first federal bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.
It followed its English precedents and was mainly aimed at protecting
creditors rather than implementing a broad discharge policy.51 As with
the English bankruptcy laws, only merchants were included within the
scope of the proceeding.52 In addition, this proceeding was involuntary
in the sense that only creditors could file the petition, and discharge was
not automatic because the approval of the bankruptcy commissioners

46.

Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at

338.
47. Blackstone recognizes the importance of honesty by stating that “the law seems
to be pretty rigid and severe against the bankrupt; but, in case he proves honest, it
makes him full amend for all this rigour and severity.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at
482
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
49. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at
344.
50. Id. at 345.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 346.
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and creditors was needed.53 Notwithstanding its pro-creditor approach,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed only three years later, unable
to hold out against the accusation that it favored mercantile interests
over agricultural ones,54 enabled creditors to receive only a small
dividend of their credit, and incited fraudulent behavior on the part of
debtors who were granted discharge.55
The U.S. Congress then enacted new federal bankruptcy legislation,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, which
did not depart from its English precedents, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841
represented a significant step in the historical evolution of bankruptcy
law, particularly with regard to tensions between the interests of
creditors and debtors.56 This was so because the severe financial crisis
of 1837 led to reduced creditor control and the introduction of two major
innovations.
First, the traditional restriction that allowed only
merchants to access the bankruptcy proceeding was repealed, enabling
“all persons whatsoever . . . owing debts” to obtain discharge.57
Furthermore, “voluntary bankruptcy” appeared for the first time,
whereby non-merchant debtors were allowed to file a petition for
bankruptcy in order to obtain discharge, subject to creditors’ approval.58
The new voluntary bankruptcy proceeding, together with the
possibility for every debtor to file a petition for discharge, dramatically

53. Id. On the involuntary character of the early bankruptcy laws, see ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES,
AND PROBLEMS 107 (2006). It is worth noting that the first voluntary bankruptcy
proceeding (where also debtors were allowed to file the petition) was the United States
Bankruptcy Law of 1841. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy
Discharge, supra note 34, at 349–50.
54. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at
348. The criticism of discharge as a device favoring the mercantile class must be read
within the broader tensions among mercantile interests represented by the Federalist
Alexander Hamilton, and agricultural interests represented by the Republican Tomas
Jefferson. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 3, 26.
55. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at
348.
56. Id. at 353.
57. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4 Stat. 444 (1841); Tabb, The Historical
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 350. In England, the
bankruptcy proceeding became available to all persons, including non-trading debtors
in 1861. See 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 134, §§ 69, 86 (Eng.).
58. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at
349–50. The voluntary character of bankruptcy was introduced in England three years
later. See 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 96, § 41 (Eng.).
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shifted the equilibrium of bankruptcy law toward favoring debtors.59
Yet, notwithstanding the new legislation’s changing of fundamental
aspects, the original rationale of discharge—to protect only the honest
but unfortunate debtor—was preserved because debtors who committed
fraudulent acts were ineligible.60
In 1898, following the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in
1842 and the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (repealed in
1878),61 the U.S. enacted a new national bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.62 Since then, a federal bankruptcy law has always been in
existence.63 In the 1898 law, both the extension of eligibility to all
debtors and the voluntary character of bankruptcy proceeding (available
to any debtor except corporations) were confirmed.64 In addition,
discharge—and therefore, a pro-debtor policy—was strengthened thanks
to the repeal of two requirements: creditors’ consent to the granting of
the discharge and the payment of a minimum dividend to creditors.65
Thus, the main goal of bankruptcy law was no longer to protect
creditors from the abusive behavior of the mercantile class, but rather to
allow debtors suffering from business misfortunes to once again become
59. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 349–50.
60. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 5 Stat. 440 (1841).
61. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
63. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at
362.
64. Id. at 363.
65. Id. at 364. “No check on discharges other than the statutory limitations
remained. This innovation marked as much as anything else the arrival of the ‘modern’
American pro-debtor discharge policy.” Id. (“The reform in the United States thus was
more radical than the 1883 English reform, in which control of the discharge simply
had been shifted from creditors to the court. Surprisingly, this major change in basic
policy occurred with little fanfare or debate.”); see also SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION,
supra note 21, at 38–39 (“Unlike creditor organizations, farmers and other rural
constituencies did not send memorials to Congress or develop specific legislative
proposals. Yet bankruptcy was an extraordinarily prominent issue, and lawmakers from
farm states actively promoted the ideological views of their rural constituents.
Ideological entrepreneurs such as Representative Bailey of Texas, who spearheaded the
campaign for a voluntary-only bankruptcy bill in the mid-1890s, and Senator Stewart of
Nevada, provided a public face for the prodebtor perspective. . . . By the 1890s,
populist lawmakers were the standard bearers for the prodebtor perspective, and the
debates that led to the 1898 act were full of their exchanges with proponents of a
federal bankruptcy law.”).
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a useful member of society.66 Accordingly, discharge—first introduced
to encourage debtors’ cooperation in satisfying creditors’ interests67—
had entirely become a means to protect debtors.68 This radical shift
within the common law tradition from a pro-creditor to pro-debtor
system was justified by the growing acceptance that freeing debtors
from their burdensome debts and repositioning them to become
productive again would improve economic efficiency.69
Yet, the new widespread possibility for merchants to protect their
personal assets (“limited liability”) through the creation of a new legal
entity made discharge less appealing for commercial activities and
placed non-trading debtors (those not engaged in a commercial activity)
at the center stage of the bankruptcy proceeding.70 In fact, discharge
was—just as it is today—capable of achieving for individuals the same
legal effect that was achieved through the formation of a new legal
entity in commercial activities: limiting the debtor’s liability toward his
creditors.71

66. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary
purposes of the bankruptcy legislation is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh, free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes . . . to give to the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort.”).
See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law – A Comparison of
the Recent Bankruptcy Acts of Italy and the United States, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 406
(1947); see also SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 43; Zywicki, supra note
21, at 1471.
67. See supra Part II.A.1.
68. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 364–65.
69. See TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, supra note 36, at 94–96.
70. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 363 (“With the increased availability of the corporate form to limit liability for
entrepreneurs, discharge in bankruptcy now was principally important only for nonmerchants individuals.”); see also Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH.
L. REV. 49, 65 (1986) (showing how in the first half of the twentieth century the typical
bankrupt shifted from merchant to wage earner). On the historical evolution of
organizational forms in the common law tradition, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier
Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335
(2006).
71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD &
THOMAS J. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 34 (2d ed.
1990).
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Notwithstanding the further strengthening of debtor interests in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the original rationale for discharge (the
protection of the honest but unfortunate debtor)72 was, as with the
Bankruptcy Act 1841,73 reaffirmed in this legislation.
If the debtor has acted dishonestly by committing certain acts
forbidden in the bill he will not be discharged; if he has acted
honestly he will be. The granting of a discharge is justified by a
wise public policy. The granting or withholding of it is dependent
74
upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate.

Yet, unlike English bankruptcy law, where discharge was submitted
to strict judicial discretion,75 the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 made
discharge more or less automatic, repealing nearly every judicial check
on discharge aside from the statutory limitations.76 The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, therefore, marked the start of a gradual departure of U.S.
bankruptcy law from its original intuition, which was to forgive only
those debtors that were victims of exogenous misfortunes. It was only
until the twentieth century that bankruptcy discharge underwent a more
radical ideological transformation: from a safety net for the honest but
unfortunate debtor to providing a safe harbor for any over-indebted
person.77
B. THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: A PRO-CREDITOR APPROACH
In the nineteenth century, the civil law and common law traditions
parted ways regarding the treatment of non-trading debtors’ liability
toward creditors. Until 1841 in the United States and 1861 in England,78
only traders and merchants were eligible for bankruptcy discharge while
non-trading debtors were forced into coercive imprisonment until they
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Riesenfeld, supra note 66, at 406.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
H.R. Rep. No. 55-65, at 43 (1897).
See The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 52, § 18(6) (Eng.); see also
SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 363–64.
76. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; Tabb, The Historical
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 363–64.
77. See infra Part III.A.
78. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note
34, at 334–35 n.57 and accompanying text.
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could fully repay their debts.79 Yet, the common law of the midnineteenth century, by making all debtors eligible for discharge,
radically amended the regime for non-trading debtors.
Meanwhile, during the first half of the 1800s, several civil law
countries—particularly those influenced by the Napoleon Code of
1804—also had legal regimes that excluded non-trading debtors from
bankruptcy laws and therefore, from discharge. Furthermore, these
countries regulated debtor liability on the premise that all of the debtor’s
property was charged with the performance of the debtor’s obligations.
Accordingly, debtor property was the common pledge of creditors, a
principle known as “universal patrimonial liability.”80
The historical evolution of the concept of patrimony helps to
explain this approach.81 An anthropocentric vision arose out of the
philosophy borne by the Enlightenment and Romantic movements
whereby assets or property were conceived as the external manifestation
of an individual and thus, a tangible expression of the human
personality.82 The notion of such an indissoluble bond between the
individual and his patrimony shifted from a philosophical doctrine to a
legal one during the first half of the nineteenth century.83 “Since human
attributes were indivisible and intangible, the patrimony was also
considered indivisible and intangible.”84 Therefore, all of a debtor’s
property was conceived as the common pledge of creditors, leading to
the idea of universal patrimonial liability.85 Although civil law scholars
began to question the singleness and indivisibility of patrimony doctrine
in the early twentieth century, the fundamental dogma remained that

79. See id.; see also Cohen, supra note 29, at 157–59 (noting that in the
seventeenth century, England introduced insolvency proceedings which aimed to
exempt from imprisonment those debtors that were not trying to defraud their creditors
but were simply insolvent).
80. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
81. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 527–30.
82. See id. at 527 & n.40.
83. See id. (internal citations omitted). “This shift is normally ascribed to a French
[legal] handbook written by a German scholar, K.S. Zachariae, and subsequently
updated and augmented by two French scholars, Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours
de Droit Civil Français, d’Après l’Ouvrage de M. C.S. Zacharie (1856-1858).” Id. at
527 n.41; see Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Français, d’Après
l’Ouvrage de M. C.S. Zacharie (1856-1858), available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/
ark:/12148/bpt6k5846820d/f8.image.
84. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 527.
85. See id. at 525, 527, 529–30.
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only a numerus clausus of circumstances provided by law could limit a
debtor’s liability.86
Thus, when the common law tradition was introducing bankruptcy
discharge for non-trading debtors,87 the civil law tradition was codifying
the universal patrimonial liability principle.88 The shift in the common
law tradition from creditors’ dominion—evident in the practice of
imprisonment for debts—to a pro-debtor system characterized by a
broader scope of bankruptcy discharge was the result of an economicsbased premise, according to which it is considered more efficient to
readmit debtors into a productive economic cycle.89 On the other hand,
the universal patrimonial liability rule typified by the civil law tradition
was shaped around doctrinal and dogmatic debates on the nature of
patrimony.90 The different historical courses of the common law and
civil law traditions with regard to non-trading debtors’ liability explain
the conventional wisdom according to which common law’s liberal
bankruptcy discharge policy makes it a pro-debtor system, while civil
law’s universal patrimonial liability rule makes it a pro-creditor one.91
86. A clear example of this approach can be found in Article 2645 of the Civil
Code of Québec: “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its performance,
all his property, movable and immovable, present and future, except property . . . which
is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by law.” CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q.
1991, c. 64, art. 2645 (Can.). An identical principle is stated in Article 2740 Italian
Civil Code: “The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his present and future
assets. Limitations of liability are not allowed except in the circumstances provided by
law.” Art. 2740 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.).
87. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 45, 64, and 70 and accompanying text.
90. One could argue that bankruptcy discharge is not technically an exception to
the universal patrimonial liability rule, since it eliminates the debt itself instead of
limiting the assets that are charged with the performance of the debt. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that discharge and universal patrimonial liability represent two opposite
policies governing debtor-creditor relations. As has been noticed in the Italian doctrine,
“Notwithstanding our legal tradition provides that the debtor is responsible for his
obligations with all his present and future assets (Art. 2740 C. Civ.), in principle,
there’s nothing to prevent that that tradition, in light of other requirements in case
considered nowadays prevailing, could be changed.” See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at
438.
91. Among the many authors on the favorable treatment that debtors receive in the
U.S. system, see SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 1 (“What is clear,
however, is that U.S. bankruptcy law is far more sympathetic to debtors than are the
laws of other nations.”). The favor creditoris in the Italian legal system is emphasized,
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III. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE
MOST RECENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
A. FROM A REMEDY FOR THE HONEST BUT UNFORTUNATE DEBTOR TO A
SAFE HARBOR FOR THE OVER-INDEBTED DEBTOR
Before verifying whether the respective labels of “pro-debtor” and
“pro-creditor” for common and civil law regimes are compatible with a
new descriptive analysis conducted through the lens of the behavioral
law-and-economics methodology, it is worth emphasizing the trends that
characterize discharge in the United States over the last fifty years.
As highlighted in Part I.B of this Article, in the past few decades,
continental European countries generally trended toward the adoption of
bankruptcy discharge and the inclusion of consumers within the scope of
bankruptcy laws.92 In contrast, in the United States—traditionally the
most liberal country in terms of access to discharge—the past decades
have been marked by a heated debate over the question of whether to
limit the scope of discharge.
Starting in the 1960s, the consumer credit industry strongly invoked
the adoption of regulations to restrict discharge.93 In particular, financial
institutions lobbied for Congress to adopt the so-called “means test,” a
provision that would prevent a debtor from obtaining immediate
discharge through the liquidation of the debtor’s assets and instead force
that debtor to go through a program of debt adjustment upon being able
to repay at least some of the debts.94 Despite creditors’ aggressive
efforts, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, whose findings
shaped the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,95 rejected the means test and
adopted a debtor-oriented approach.
An especially notable innovation is the Commission’s proposal to
repeal the provision in the Chapter 13 proceedings that denied discharge
for any debt based upon a fraudulent financial statement (the “fraud
exception”).96 The elimination of this fraud exception from the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and the resulting Chapter 13 “super
discharge,” one that includes debt based on a fraudulent statement,
among others, by ENRICO MOSCATI, LA DISCIPLINA GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI –
CORSO DI DIRITTO CIVILE 32 (2012).
92. See supra Part I.B.
93. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 154.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 139.
96. See id. at 154–55.
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reveals the enormous divide between the original rationale of the policy
(protecting the honest but unfortunate debtor) and the modern version,
which also applies to, at least in some circumstances,97 the dishonest
debtor.
By the twentieth century, the original prerequisite for obtaining
discharge—that an honest debtor was the victim of an exogenous,
misfortunate event that caused the financial distress—was no longer
required.98 In this much more basic model, over-indebtedness was the
only prerequisite for discharge, regardless of the reasons for the
financial distress and the honesty of the debtor.99 The gradual
affirmation of debtors’ interests has culminated in a radical new reading
of the expression “honest but unfortunate,” which now extends the
concept of “misfortune” to include all debtors who are unable to repay a
debt, even when the debt originated as the result of a bad financial
judgment, imprudence, or sometimes, a fraudulent act.100

97. Section 1328(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, in its original version
preceding BAPCPA (see infra note 104 and accompanying text), did not exempt from
discharge debt obtained through false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud,
missing a specific reference to § 523(a)(2)(A) where exceptions to discharge are
regulated. See also infra note 107.
98. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
99. The radical shift in the bankruptcy discharge rationale is exemplified by the
statement made before the U.S. Congress by Ellen Broadman, representative of the
Consumers Union, during the hearings held in 1984 for the reform of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978: “The proposal is totally at odds with the philosophy underlying the
bankruptcy law of allowing individuals who are overwhelmed by crushing debt
obligations to start a new, fresh life without debt burden.” SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION,
supra note 21, at 193–94. The deep transformation of the prerequisites for bankruptcy
discharge is also apparent when comparing Broadman’s words with an opinion
delivered by an English judge in 1810: “[r]elief is to be extended to those who are both
honest and unfortunate. Honesty alone will not be a title, if the debtor has come to his
ruin by his own imprudence, without misfortune.” Brown’s Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 158,
159–60 (La. 1810).
100. This approach is clearly expressed by Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver,
and the Behavioral Undercurrents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 25
(2006) (“Every debtor in dire financial straits is ‘unfortunate.’ You are eligible for a
discharge even if your financial difficulties arise from bad judgment or improvidence,
as long as you are honest. Honest people are sometimes unable to pay what they owe,
and when this happens the law should be there to help. So long as they act in good
faith, the right to discharge in bankruptcy is available. Instead of limiting the discharge
to only some debtors in dire straits, the word ‘unfortunate’ now merely describes their
condition.”).
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B. A CHANGE IN TREND IN THE UNITED STATES CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Due to the relative neglect of the pro-creditor position in the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the consumer credit industry insisted on the
need to restrict access to bankruptcy discharge, stressing that bankruptcy
filings increased by 60% within one year of the law’s passage and had
constantly increased since.101 In the second half of the 1990s, financial
institutions submitted a new proposal to Congress that would introduce a
means test into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 in order to limit automatic
discharge under Chapter 7 and instead, have Chapter 13 apply to debtors
who were capable of paying some portions of their debts.102 Despite the
efforts of progressive bankruptcy scholars who firmly opposed this
means test103 on the ground that consumers are best protected through
broad access to discharge, in 2005, financial institutions won the battle
with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).104
According to the scholars who supported the means test, BAPCPA
forces debtors with incomes above their state median and higher than a
specified portion of their debts to follow a debt adjustment plan.105
Ultimately, BAPCPA is designed to end abusive behaviors of those who
use discharge to strategically plan their finances (so-called the
“bankruptcy of convenience”).106 Furthermore, the lobbyists also
101.
102.
103.

See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 190.
Id. at 202.
According to progressive bankruptcy scholars, the elimination of the choice
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is equivalent to the re-establishment of a modern
form of “involuntary servitude” for individuals and the betrayal of the pro-debtor U.S.
approach to consumer bankruptcy. Id. at 194–95, 204; see also Vern Countryman,
Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor – and a Modest Proposal to Return to the
Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 826–27 (1983) [hereinafter
Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor].
104. On the advisability of introducing the “means test,” see Edith H. Jones & Todd
J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 215 (1999).
105. The “means test” is regulated by § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012).
106. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1497 (“Second, a debtor’s increased use of
credit cards preceding bankruptcy may also reflect strategic behavior taken in
anticipation of filing bankruptcy. Credit card debt is unsecured debt that can be
discharged in bankruptcy. By contrast, some unsecured debts are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy, and secured debts, such as home and auto loans, are minimally affected.
For unsecured credit card debt, by contrast, generally the debtor can retain the property
purchased with the credit card and discharge the obligation. Given the choice between
defaulting on secured or nondischargeable obligations on the one hand versus
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promised that the reform would not exclude bankruptcy’s prototypical
“honest and unfortunate debtor” with median or below-median income
from obtaining discharge.107
Meanwhile, the progressive camp argued that the real scope of
BAPCPA did not limit access to Chapter 7 discharge for solvent debtors,
but rather deferred bankruptcy filing for all debtors notwithstanding
their income and ability to repay their debts.108 In other words, financial
institutions did not share the goal of limiting the scope of discharge.
Instead, they wanted to make filings more complicated in order to delay
any proceedings so that debtors would continue to make payments to
creditors, thereby increasing creditors’ revenues.109
In any case, the reform of 2005 undoubtedly marked a clear shift
away from the pro-debtor ideological monopoly that had characterized
U.S. bankruptcy law since the mid-nineteenth century.

dischargeable credit card debt on the other, the incentive is to use credit cards to finance
payment of nondischargeable and secured debt.”); see also Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy
Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2007)
(“Proponents spent much less time discussing the economics of the consumer credit
industry or the business models of those most affected by consumer bankruptcy. In
particular, the debates often focused on the concept of needs-based bankruptcy—or the
concern that the skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates indicate that consumers are using
the bankruptcy system for financial planning purposes rather than as a last resort. The
catch phrase in the legislative history was the ‘bankruptcy of convenience.’”).
107. See Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E.
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 349, 352 (2008). It is
worth noting that BAPCPA repealed the superdischarge of Chapter 13 first introduced
in 1978. After the reform of 2005, § 1328(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
includes false pretenses, false representation, and actual fraud among the Chapter 13
exceptions to discharge.
108. See id. at 377–85; see also Mann, supra note 106, at 392–400.
109. See Mann, supra note 106, at 384 (“In my view, the most important aspect of
the new law is not the increased payouts associated with means testing, but the way in
which the law encourages debtors to defer bankruptcy filings.”). Id. at 392 (“If those
card users continue to make payments until shortly before they surrender and file for
bankruptcy, the delay in filing—lengthening the time in the ‘sweat box’—will increase
the profits the lenders receive from those accounts, or decrease the losses the lenders
will face when those customers ultimately file for bankruptcy.”).
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C. THE EUROPEAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY OPPOSITE TREND
Meanwhile, the European approach, which has departed from its
traditional pro-creditor approach in the past decades, rejects both the
American progressive and conservative bankruptcy traditions by
viewing discharge as a way to not only protect consumers but also to
encourage them to take on more debt.110 In rejecting these positions,111
the European trend represents a unique opportunity to reconsider the
traditional analysis and challenge the common picture of discharge as a
fundamentally pro-debtor legal device.
IV. A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
In order to give a new descriptive analysis of bankruptcy discharge,
it is first necessary to understand the core characteristics of discharge
that both the progressive and conservative bankruptcy traditions
recognize.
A. THE UNDISPUTED ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
It is commonly accepted that bankruptcy discharge aims to achieve
three different goals. One is to allow and encourage debtors, freed from
their debts, to once again become productive members of society. The
underlying premise is that the cost of the discharge is less than the cost
that society would bear if debtors, without the availability of discharge,
were excluded from economic activity due to the perpetual obligation to
repay their debts.112 This theoretical justification for discharge,
explained in terms of “freedom of opportunity,” has primarily developed
in the United States.113 According to this deeply rooted theory in
American culture, incentivizing individual risk-taking—and therefore,
collectively sharing the risk that some private initiatives will fail—is
fundamental to maximizing social welfare.114
110.
111.
112.

See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., William O. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 Y.
L.J. 329, 340 (1932); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Tabb,
Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 90.
113. See Douglas, supra note 112, at 340.
114. See id. (“The theory of freedom of opportunity which has prevailed in this
country has resulted in a minimum of governmental interference in strictly private
enterprise. Denial of discharges in bankruptcy has been guarded zealously in the
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The second goal of discharge is to provide debtors with insolvency
insurance.115 Third, the device seeks to promote debtor cooperation with
the bankruptcy trustee and creditors regarding debt collection and asset
liquidation during bankruptcy proceedings.116
B. THE PROGRESSIVE BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARSHIP
Aside from the aforementioned, uncontroversial aspects of
bankruptcy discharge, the analysis is highly ideological and held hostage
by the antithetical viewpoints of the progressive and conservative
bankruptcy scholarships.
interest of hard-pressed debtors who desire a new lease on life. The fact that this is a
country with large natural resources has led to the notion that failures can be afforded;
that experimentation in enterprise should be encouraged; that out of the failures may
come successes which will result in the promotion and development of our industrial
and economic potentialities. That the annual bill which consumers pay for such
experimentation is large is not denied. But it is insisted that it is worth the price.”); see
also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 258 (“In the United States we have opted for
dynamic economic change even at the cost of economic risk and instability. We have
chosen economic opportunity at the risk of economic hardship. We prefer a world of
winners and losers. But a world of winners and losers requires a way to cope with the
losers. If they revolt in the streets or withdraw from the economy, the costs of their
failure are displaced to the winners who cannot enjoy their prosperity in safety. The
bankruptcy discharge is an important part of the traditional, market driven American
approach to risk. Bankruptcy reduces the pain of loss while it lets the losers get back in
the game. As far back as Henry Clay, American decided that collectively we would all
be better off to cut the losers loose from their old debts so they could try the game
again.”).
115. See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 592–93 (2000); see also
Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Under
‘BAPCPA,’ 18-19 ÉCONOMIE PUBLIQUE 1, 2 (2006); Adam Feibelman, Defining the
Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129,
130 (2005).
116. Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 90 (“The debtor cooperation
theory justifies the discharge as a carrot dangled in front of debtors to induce them to
cooperate with the trustee and the creditors in the bankruptcy case in the location,
collection, and liquidation of the debtor’s assets. If the debtor cooperates, the discharge
is granted; if not, it is denied. Debtor compliance arguably benefits creditors by
increasing the size of the asset pie available for distribution and by decreasing the
administrative costs necessary to effect that distribution. In short, creditors essentially
forego the possibility of post-bankruptcy recovery tomorrow in the hope of reaping
larger bankruptcy dividends today.”).
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Until the reform of 2005, the progressive position predominantly
shaped U.S. bankruptcy discharge policy.117 Under this approach,
discharge is functionally equivalent to social insurance by allowing
debtors to mitigate the detrimental consequences of a negative
exogenous event.118 In the United States, which typically provides a
much more limited welfare system than European countries, bankruptcy
discharge is considered to be a legal device to augment Social Security
in the absence of other social safety nets.119 Thus, bankruptcy discharge
is considered to be a fundamental tool to protect the American middle
class from the risk of exogenous shocks, such as job-related income
interruptions, sickness, and costs related to marital problems, that could
transform mere indebtedness into pathological insolvency.120
Progressive scholars identify the combination of such shocks and
excessive consumer credit as the primary cause of middle-class over-

117. See supra Parts III.A and III.B. The progressive bankruptcy scholarship, which
obviously counts numerous scholars among its ranks, is typically identified with the
works of three authors, belonging to different generations: William Douglas in the
1930s, Vern Countryman in the 1960s and, since the 1990s, Elizabeth Warren.
118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1100–01
(1998); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, passim.
119. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 100; see also SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 257; Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of
the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom
to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD., 283, 307 (1995) (“[B]ankruptcy Law is analogous to
the welfare system: it is social insurance for the nonpoor.”); Jean Braucher, Consumer
Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2004); Jackson, supra note 36, at 1397–98 (“[T]he theory
must explain why, in the context of a social and economic order premised on individual
autonomy, the law should make inalienable the right to a fresh start. In particular, it
must show why the law should specifically protect individuals against the dangers of
amassing debts when it provides only a general web of social insurance programs to
protect them against the financial risks of their other activities.”).
120. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 75 (“Our data suggest that job-related
income interruption is by far the most important cause of severe financial distress for
middle-class Americans.”); see id. at 141 (“Medical science has flowered beyond the
wildest dreams of earlier generations, yet sickness and injury remain a major threat to
the economic health of every middle-class family. The two components of that threat—
either of which can plunge a family from comfortable circumstances to financial
collapse in a matter of months—are the spiraling cost of medical care and the loss of
income because of accident, illness, or disability.”); see id. at 173 (“[B]oth marital
problems and financial difficulties may arise from the same sources of trouble. Once
financial and marital problems have developed, they are likely to reinforce each other.
The interaction is often fatal both to the marriage and to the balance sheet.”).
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indebtedness.121 Accordingly, they select bankruptcy discharge as an
appropriate response.
In an ex post perspective that emphasizes remedies more than
incentives, progressive scholars treat discharge as a final resort for
reintroducing over-indebted individuals to a productive economic
cycle.122 Such a focus on the remedy to excesses on the supply side of
the consumer credit market omits consideration as to whether
bankruptcy laws—and in particular, bankruptcy discharge—contribute
to shaping debtors’ behaviors and their financial choices. Put
differently, the ex ante perspective, concerned with the incentives that
discharge poses on the demand side, is neglected by this body of
scholarship, and therefore leaves unanswered the question of whether
bankruptcy discharge contributes to over-indebtedness.123
C. THE CONSERVATIVE BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARSHIP
Conservative bankruptcy scholars, who are apparently more
sensitive to the interests of the consumer credit industry than of debtors,
take the opposite stance by arguing that a liberal approach to discharge
is the basis for severe inefficiencies.124 This pro-creditor approach
follows the ex ante perspective that typifies law-and-economics analysis
and assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested actors who are
121.
122.

Id. at 23–26.
Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor, supra note 103, at 817–
18; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22 (“As American families have faced
job losses and medical bills, divorces and home mortgages throughout the past decade,
bankruptcy has been their safety net . . . consumer debt has lowered many middle-class
families’ threshold for financial collapse. High consumer debt loads increase families’
vulnerability to every other problem—job, medical, divorce, housing—that befalls
them.”).
123. See Skeel, Progressive Bankruptcy Scholarship, supra note 24, at 1118 (“With
respect to the third factor, the rise of law and economics, current progressives remain
just as hostile as Countryman himself. In personal bankruptcy, this has meant a vigilant
defense of the fresh start, at times to the exclusion of other perspectives. Gone is any
serious suggestion that bankruptcy should be used instrumentally to shape debtors’
behavior. The occasional exceptions to this stance have a distinctly populist flavor.”);
see also Frank H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1079
(2002) (“What is troubling, however, is the implicit assumption that an ex post
perspective suffices, and that debtors do not react to the incentive structure of the
bankruptcy regime ex ante when they borrow.”).
124. See Zywicki, supra note 21, passim; see also Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104,
at 240.
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able to make efficient decisions that maximize their individual wealth
and in the aggregate, social welfare.125 Accordingly, discharge creates a
moral hazard because it grants debtors the equivalent of free insolvency
insurance, thereby incentivizing them to take on more debts and
strategically employ the fresh start benefit.126 These scholars argue that
the best response to such rational abuse is to establish stricter lending
criteria and demand more collateral, ultimately leading to a higher cost
of credit and its subsequent rationing.127
125. See Richard A. Posner, The Nature of Economic Reasoning, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 1 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Thomas S. Ulen eds., 1998);
see also Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and Without Regret,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 13 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon
L. Smith eds., 2005).
126. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1466 (“On the other hand, the option of
bankruptcy creates a moral hazard problem and increases the risk associated with
consumer lending, leading creditors to charge higher interest rates, demand collateral or
a larger down payment, increase monitoring to prevent default, or increase penalties for
risky behavior such as late payments.”); id. at 1477 (“Thus, if it is easy to file
bankruptcy and to discharge debt, individuals will want to borrow more and incur more
risk than if bankruptcy makes it difficult to discharge debt. Indeed, this is a primary
purpose for bankruptcy law—to make individuals less risk-averse and willing to incur
more debt than they would absent a bankruptcy law.”).
127. Id. (“Lenders, of course, have opposite incentives and will be more willing to
provide more credit when bankruptcy laws are strict and less where bankruptcy is
easy.”); see also Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104, at 248. Following the idea that the
bankruptcy system makes credit more expensive one study has argued that, because of
bankruptcy laws, each American household bears a higher cost of credit equal to $280
per year. See Kartik B. Athreya, Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1999, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1567, 1583 (2002). When President George W. Bush
signed BAPCPA in 2005, echoing conservative bankruptcy scholars, he stated: “when
bankruptcy is less common, credit can be extended to more people at better rates.”
Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices,
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2009); see also id. at 3 (citing the statement made by Prof.
Zywicki before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the hearings preceding the
approval of BAPCPA in 2005: “This bankruptcy ‘tax’ takes many forms. It is
obviously reflected in higher interest rates. . . . It is [also] reflected in shorter grace
periods for paying bills and higher penalty fees and late-charges for those who miss
payments . . . [R]educing the number of strategic bankruptcies will reduce the
bankruptcy tax paid by every American family . . . . These reforms will make the
bankruptcy system more fair, equitable, and efficient, not only for bankruptcy debtors
and creditors, but for all Americans.”). For an argument against the conservative
bankruptcy tradition, see SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 84 (“[I]f changes
in the bankruptcy laws cause more debtors to discharge their debts, for instance,
creditors will scrutinize their borrowers more carefully and either ration credit or charge
higher interest rates. This solution has downsides for creditors, of course. Rationing
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Furthermore, conservative scholars argue that the considerable
increase in bankruptcy filings over the past three decades is due to the
increased inclination of Americans to strategically use discharge as a
financial planning tool,128 not because of a more fragile condition of the
American middle class victimized by predatory lending techniques.129
These proponents regard the ease of accessing consumer credit as a
symptom of American prosperity rather than a source of overindebtedness and insolvency.
Therefore, progressive bankruptcy
scholars should not focus on the supply side of consumer credit and
instead, look elsewhere to understand why Americans file for
bankruptcy so much more than in the past.130
credit means making fewer loans. And raising interest rates creates an adverse
selection problem: the higher interest rates may drive low-risk borrowers out of the
credit market, leaving a disproportionate percentage of high-risk borrowers. . . . [I]n
either case, however, much of the cost will be passed on to borrowers.”).
128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part IV.B.
130. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1474 (“This rapid increase in filings has been
especially difficult to explain in light of the prosperous state of the American economy
during most of the past two decades, and, especially, the extraordinary prosperity of the
late 1990s. Although the American economy set new records for economic growth, low
unemployment, and low interest rates, this same period was also marked by record-high
bankruptcy filings. The Traditional model [i.e., the progressive approach] has tried to
reconcile this anomaly of record-high prosperity matched with record-high bankruptcy
filing rates by arguing that the economic prosperity of the past two decades is
superficial and masks real underlying economic distress. Proponents of the Traditional
model thus do not question its fundamental validity; rather, they advocate digging
deeper into the evidence to locate factual support for its continuing explanatory
power.”). According to the pro-creditor point of view, consumer credit availability,
including subprime lending, functions to strengthen low-income households and does
not favor their financial problems. Id. at 1487–88 (“For the majority of borrowers,
therefore, the growth of the subprime market has enabled them to move from renting to
buying housing, permitting them to build equity in their homes as a valuable asset to
build wealth, rather than merely paying rent. Moreover, homeownership is the best
way for many low-income households to build wealth, as investments in stocks and
bonds are not likely to be realistic options. In fact, homeownership has been such a
potent vehicle for wealth accumulation that the polarization of wealth between
homeowners and renters has risen dramatically in recent years, even as the wealth
polarization among different income classes has decreased. For those who also use
their homes for a home equity loan, this can be an attractive alternative to the poor
credit options otherwise available to high-risk, low-income borrowers. The expansion
of the subprime lending market, therefore, has enabled low-income households to
acquire an asset that has appreciated in value over the past decade, and thereby has
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Having excluded lending techniques as a contributing factor to the
financial distress of U.S. households, these scholars explain the rising
tendency of the middle class to access discharge as a rational but
abusive response to three major changes. First, the Bankruptcy Code of
1978 altered the cost-benefit analysis of discharge, which had become
too favorable to debtors at a very moderate cost.131 Second, the radical
change over the last three decades in social norms has reduced, if not
annulled, the social stigma that traditionally accompanied discharge.132
Third, lending techniques have become more impersonal in nature,
undermining the trust between debtors and creditors that traditionally
reduced the willingness of debtors to default.133
D. THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCHARGE RECONSIDERED BASED ON
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
The financial crisis of 2008 challenges and undermines the logical
basis for the conservative position, according to which the ample
availability of consumer credit increases the welfare of American
households.134 This is because the crisis plainly illustrates the risks of
taking on too much debt (due to the wide availability of consumer credit
over the past two decades) and the ability of financial institutions to take
advantage of the information asymmetries inherent to loan
agreements.135 A significant percentage of Americans, thanks to the
easy access to subprime lending, were able to buy a house and ended up

enabled rapid wealth-building. Thus, the data indicates that wealth has increased across
the board (albeit at different rates), which suggests that the aggregate figures on
household wealth are not disguising unrecognized hardship among some demographic
groups.”).
131. See id. at 1527–32; Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104, at 209–15; David B.
Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and
Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 319, 320 (2002); White, supra note 115, at 8–10.
132. On the historical evolution of social stigma related to bankruptcy, see Efrat,
Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 29, at 365–66; Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1532–34;
Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT’L J. 870, 871 (1997) (according to Alan
Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “personal bankruptcies are
soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame”).
133. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1534–36; see also Buckley, supra note 123, at
1085–86.
134. See supra Part IV.C.
135. For more on the financial crisis see generally Adam J. Levitin & Susan M.
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012).
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being over-indebted, resulting in massive exposure to foreclosures.136
Accordingly, with the benefit of hindsight, the progressive argument
that the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings resulted from predatory
lending techniques is more accurate. It correctly observes that the overindebted American middle class, far from growing more prosperous due
to consumer and subprime credit, becomes much more vulnerable to
potential exogenous shocks.137
Yet, while these scholars correctly anticipated the noxious effects
of too much debt138 and identified consumer credit as the fundamental
reason behind the filing explosion, they have neither fully accounted for
the reasons behind consumers’ tendency toward over-indebtedness nor
come up with any possible solutions. By focusing on the need to make
credit safer through stricter regulation of the supply side of the
consumer credit industry,139 on the demand side, these scholars fail to go
much further than merely defending discharge as the last remedy to
protect debtors.140 Their neglect of the ex ante perspective overlooks the
possibility that bankruptcy discharge shapes inefficient behavior on the
part of debtors.141
Therefore, in order to fully understand the reasons for consumers’
tendency to take on excessive debt, it is necessary to return to the ex
ante perspective of pro-creditor scholars. To truly grasp individual
decision-making processes in this context, more sophisticated analytical
tools are needed than the ones suggested by the homo economicus
paradigm that normally lies at the foundation of law-and-economics
bankruptcy discourse.
In 1957, Herbert Simon coined the expression “bounded
rationality” to indicate that actors often fail to satisfy the utilitymaximization assumption due to “heuristics,” which basically are
mental shortcuts that people use to simplify decision-making.142

136. See Michele A. Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 400–05 (2009).
137. See supra Part IV.B.
138. See id.; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22–26.
139. For more on this perspective, see generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
140. See supra Part IV.B.
141. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
142. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198, 270–71
(1957); see also Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
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Subsequent research in the behavioral sciences demonstrates that
individuals are systematically biased when predicting the results of
different events.143 Both heuristics and biases lead individuals to make
decisions that contradict the “rational choice theory” or “expected utility
theory,” according to which individuals rationally balance the benefits
and costs of their actions in order to maximize their personal
advantage.144
Studies using principles of cognitive psychology to examine
consumption habits show that over-indebtedness can be explained, at
least to some degree, by bounded rationality because individuals do not
always select the “right” amount of debt.145 In particular, individuals,
such as debtors, tend to underestimate the risks of over-indebtedness and
the likelihood of default, notwithstanding the statistics showing the high
probability of default on certain types of loans (i.e., subprime loans).
They tend to exclude the possibility that they could be exposed to an
exogenous shock that would undermine their ability to fulfill their
obligations.146 This underestimation of risk in general is called the
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1075 (2000).
143. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choice, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCH. 341, 341 (1984).
144. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953), at 15–31.
145. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism and the Misguided Reform of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEXAS L.
REV. 1481, 1489 (2006).
146. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1400 (“Underestimation of
future borrowing may also result from an optimism bias that might lead consumers to
underestimate the likelihood of contingencies bearing economic hardship. Specifically,
consumers might underestimate the likelihood of adverse events that might generate a
need to borrow. Optimistic individuals tend to underestimate the probability of being
involved in an accident that might generate high medical bills or other liquidity needs.
Similarly, individuals tend to underestimate the probability that either they or a loved
one will become ill and require costly treatment (that is not covered, or not entirely
covered, by their insurance plan). Finally, individuals tend to underestimate the
likelihood that they will lose their job or underestimate the length of time it will take
them to find a new job. These and other manifestations of the optimism bias will lead
consumers to underestimate the likelihood that they will be forced to resort to credit
card borrowing.”); Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, supra note 6, at 1079 (“Optimistic borrowers underestimate the
future cost of the deferred-cost contract. They overestimate their future income. They
expect to have unrealistically attractive refinance options. Or, they overestimate the
expected value of a bet placed on the real estate market, perhaps because they
irrationally expect that a 10 percent price increase last year will be replicated next year.
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“optimism bias.”147 Because of this cognitive distortion, debtors
underestimate the costs of borrowing and perform an inaccurate costbenefit analysis when shopping for loans.148
Other biases also help explain why consumers make harmful
financial decisions. For example, the use of credit cards diminishes the
sensation of loss that consumers experience when they pay in cash,
contributing to a phenomenon that cognitive psychologists define as
“bounded willpower.”149 This concept explains why small credit card
transactions can accumulate into a conspicuous debt that would not have
been assumed in a single transaction.150 “Hyperbolic discount,” the
preference for immediate gratification over future gains, is also
considered to plausibly explain consumers’ tendency to take on
If myopic and optimistic borrowers focus on the short term and discount the long term,
then lenders will offer deferred-cost contracts with low short-term prices and high longterm prices.”); see also Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory
Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 735–37 (2005); Baird, supra note 100, at 18; Jackson,
supra note 36, at 1411–12; Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’, supra note
6, at 85.
147. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249,
252 (2006). Cognitive psychology studies have demonstrated multiple situations where
individuals are affected by the optimism bias. For example, it is common among
smokers to believe that they will be able to quit smoking in the future. See Paul Slovic,
What Does It Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk? Adolescents’ Perceptions of ShortTerm and Long-Term Consequences of Smoking, 13 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 259, 261
(2000). Similarly, recently married couples deny the possibility that their relationship
will end in a divorce, disregarding statistics showing a high rate of divorce. See Bruno
S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Marriage Paradoxes, 8 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY
187, 196 (1996).
148. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1378 (“The underestimation
bias that underlies the identified welfare costs also qualifies the no-intervention
presumption of the freedom-of-contract paradigm. If a contracting party misconceives
the future consequences of the contract, then the normative power of contractual
consent is significantly weakened.”).
149. See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way
or the Hard Way:” Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183, 196 (2006).
150. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1399 (“Imperfect selfcontrol leading to the underestimation of future borrowing has been traced back to the
temporal separation between the decision to obtain a credit card and the decision to
borrow on the credit card. But, in fact, there is not one, but rather many borrowing
decisions. Each time the consumer swipes her card, a new loan is entered into. This
piecemeal borrowing phenomenon, or ‘a-little-at-a-time borrowing,’ exacerbates the
self-control problem.”); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 130.
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excessive debt.151 The concept explains that borrowers overestimate the
benefit of an immediate loan while underestimating the cost of future
interest.152
Lastly, the way that borrowers evaluate gains and losses depends
on how a certain choice (i.e., taking out a mortgage loan) is framed.153
“Framing” is a cognitive bias whereby
two different statements of a choice are logically equivalent but not
transparently equivalent. Normally consumers are not conscious of
alternate ways of framing decisions or of the psychological effects of
different frames. Thus, how a decision is framed can manipulate and
momentarily shift the order of a homeowner’s preferences. Framing
is the alchemy that permits predatory lenders to manipulate the order
of homeowners’ preferences and overcome their otherwise strong
154
aversion to losing their homes.

This behavioral law-and-economics analysis elucidates that
excessive debt is not necessarily the outcome of individual rational
choices or a symptom of American middle-class prosperity, as argued

151. See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 15 (1998); see also Bar-Gill,
Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1396 (“A consumer is said to be a hyperbolic
discounter if her short-run discount rate is larger than her long-run discount rate . . .
When a hyperbolic discounter is naïve about the nature of her time preferences, she will
overestimate her will-power, and consequently underestimate her future borrowing.”);
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, supra
note 6, at 1119. But see Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 131 (2006) (offering an argument in
defense of the economic rationale for teaser rates: “So what is wrong with teaser rates
anyhow? Go into any bakery and there are free samples that are intended to entice
customers into purchases. The baker gets a new product to customers who might not
buy the full package taste unknown. Wine is sold the same way. So it is with lending
agreements. Try this bank out to see whether you like their customer service, their
monthly payments, their promotional devices. There is an easy informational
explanation that does not require an appeal to hyperbolic discount rates. Indeed, if that
were the explanation, then we should expect frantic customers in search of short-term
gains to grab the next teaser rate that comes along when the first expires. But most
customers keep a bank because they like the relationship even when the low rate
expires. Banning these rates will do no good, and it could easily work some
anticompetitive harm, by making it more difficult for new banks to pry customers away
from established competitors.”).
152. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1396.
153. McCoy, supra note 146, at 731–32.
154. See id.
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by conservative bankruptcy scholars.155 Rather, over-indebtedness is
better explained as the consequence of faulty decision-making processes
that are vulnerable to a pandemic of consumer credit and predatory
lending techniques.156
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has shown that financial
institutions ably exploited the aforementioned information asymmetries
by shaping offers of credit based on borrowers’ cognitive mistakes and
aggressively marketing loans that would give prominence to immediate
benefits and obscure long-term costs.157 This contradicts the traditional
law-and-economics analysis, according to which the increase in
consumer bankruptcy procedures would have led to the rationing of
credit by financial institutions,158 because the financial industry—
particularly in the past twenty years—had expanded offers of credit by
using subprime loans to reach out to all types of borrowers, including
those in financial straits and delinquent debtors desperate to refinance

155.
156.

See supra Part IV.C.
The explosion of consumer credit, and consequent excessive level of household
debt that followed, occurred in the U.K. in similar fashion to the United States.
Between 2001 and 2005, the newspaper The Guardian published more than 50 pieces
covering the “unsuitable borrowing binge.” On the U.K. “debt culture,” also described
as “live now pay later culture,” see Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’,
supra note 6, at 75–76, 82. A similar tendency has characterized the Brazilian economy
over the past few years, where the high reliance on consumer credit has been described
as a “credit hangover.” See Lima-Marques & Benjamin, supra note 6, at 60–61. On the
relationship between the increase of consumer credit and the increase in consumer
bankruptcy filings, see generally Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit
Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (1997); David A. Moss & Gibbs
A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73
AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1999).
157. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1376 (“The underestimation
bias can explain the unique pricing patterns in the credit card market. If consumers
underestimate their future borrowing, issuers can be expected to raise the long-term,
borrowing-contingent elements of the credit card price. Thus, interest rates as well as
late and over-limit fees are set above marginal cost, since consumers are insufficiently
sensitive to variation in these long-term elements of the credit card price. On the other
hand, competition in the credit card market forces issuers to compensate for these high,
long-term prices by under-pricing the short-term, non-contingent elements of the credit
card contract, which are not subject to the underestimation bias. To attract consumers,
issuers must resort to below-marginal-cost (and even negative) prices in setting annual
and per-transaction fees as well as introductory, short-term interest rates (teaser
rates).”); see also Sunstein, supra note 147, at 267–68.
158. See supra Part IV.C.
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their previous obligations. The increase in bankruptcy filings did not
result in the rationing of credit because creditors anticipated the rate of
default and therefore, passed the cost of discharge onto solvent debtors
through higher interest.159 It appears, then, that the 2005 BAPCPA
reform of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 that financial institutions so
fiercely pursued was indeed not aimed at limiting access to bankruptcy
discharge, but rather at delaying proceedings to force debtors into
remaining in the “sweat box” longer, thereby increasing lenders’
profits.160
V. A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
A. RESTORING THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF COMMON LAW
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE
The behavioral law-and-economics analysis provides a much more
realistic picture of the consumer credit market than the traditional
economics approach. Over-indebtedness is persuasively explained in
terms of the cognitive mistakes that affect the demand side of the
consumer credit market, particularly borrowers’ tendency to
underestimate the expected costs of a loan that results in unreasonably
risky financial decisions. It is also explained by the supply side’s ability
to exploit the information asymmetries pertaining to loan agreements and
then pass the costs of bankruptcy discharge onto society, particularly
financially sound debtors.
This Part focuses on the demand side of the consumer credit market
and aims to show, from a normative perspective, how to shape
bankruptcy discharge policy in order to correct borrowers’ cognitive
mistakes.161 In particular, this Part challenges the view of progressive
159. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 190 (“When individual debtors
file for bankruptcy, much of what they discharge is consumer credit, since these
obligations are generally unsecured and thus unprotected. This does not mean that
credit card companies and other consumer creditors lose more and more money as the
number of bankruptcy filings increases, of course. So long as consumer creditors can
anticipate their losses, they can pass much of the cost on to future borrowers by raising
interest rates or restricting access to credit. The cost of these adjustments falls on future
debtors, not the consumer creditors.”).
160. On the real scope of BAPCPA, as alleged by progressive bankruptcy scholars,
see supra Part III.B.
161. As shown above, progressive bankruptcy scholars have traditionally neglected
to consider the incentives that bankruptcy discharge poses to borrowers, focusing on the
opportunity for stricter regulation of the supply side of the consumer credit market. See
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scholars that discharge should be accessible to any over-indebted
individual regardless of the reasons for the debt162 because this ex post
perspective fails to consider the contribution of discharge to the
structure of incentives that, ex ante, influence borrowers’ decisionmaking processes and eventually their financial decisions.163 This
paradigm seems to have overlooked the consequences, on borrowers’
incentives, of the dramatic twentieth-century shift in the rationale for
discharge, which stopped being the last resort for the honest but
unfortunate debtor and became a safe harbor for any debtor in financial
distress.164

supra Part IV.B. In particular, these scholars have suggested correcting information
asymmetries through information-based mandatory provisions. See id. It has been
argued that by making the potential consequences of over-indebtedness more apparent,
borrowers would spontaneously correct their optimism bias. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by
Plastic, supra note 6, at 1420 (“Information-based intervention has been proven
feasible and effective in other contexts. Mandatory warnings on cigarette or drug
packaging are a prominent example. The success of the anti-smoking and anti-drug
advertisement campaigns is also suggestive. Perhaps the modern tendency to finance
consumption with debt, without a complete understanding of the future repercussions of
such a tendency, can be (at least partially) overcome through the provision of
information.”). Information-based regulation could certainly prove to be useful but at
the same time insufficient to cure cognitive mistakes. As shown by scholars using
behavioral law-and-economics methodology, information provided to consumers may
prove ineffective when consumers, affected by the optimism bias, disregard the
likelihood of being exposed to a negative event (e.g., defaulting on loan payments).
Therefore, the way that information is provided (e.g., framing consequences in terms of
losses rather than gain in order to exploit borrowers’ loss aversion) is fundamental to
the effectiveness of information-based regulations. See Lauren E. Willis, Against
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 203 (2008); Lauren E. Willis,
Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Education, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2009); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1536–37 (1998);
BLOCK-LIEB ET AL., supra note 19, at 154, 171; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 260–61.
162. See supra Part III.A. and notes 99–100.
163. On the contrary, traditional law-and-economics analysis should take credit for
adopting an ex ante perspective and taking into consideration the “institutions that
provide the incentives and constraints on filing bankruptcy.” Zywicki, supra note 21, at
1526, n.236. If law-and-economics scholars are correct in adopting an ex ante
perspective, they fall short in recognizing evidence of borrowers’ cognitive mistakes,
and proven wrong in arguing that consumers opportunistically use bankruptcy
discharge as a tool to plan their finances. See supra Part IV.C.
164. See supra Part III.A.
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The term “unfortunate,” traditionally tied to the idea of an
exogenous shock (i.e., merchant misfortunes at sea, job loss, medical
problems, or divorce), gradually became synonymous in U.S.
bankruptcy law with “over-indebted.” The long-established legal
principle that holds individuals liable for negligent behavior (i.e.,
prodigality or extravagance) while still deserving relief in the case of an
“act of God” (i.e., the loss of a ship in a tempest) was abandoned with
little challenge during the twentieth century.165 The resulting prospect of
automatic discharge, independent of a judiciary or administrative filter
that would assess a borrower’s negligence,166 translates into a direct fall
in borrowing costs, which multiplies any existing optimism bias,
bounded willpower, and hyperbolic discount.167 The possibility of
bearing no liability for assuming too much debt, while not necessarily
translating into opportunistic and hazardous behaviors as conservative
scholars would argue,168 might influence borrowers’ decision-making
processes and lead to excessive debt.169

165. See supra Part II.A, and note 41 and accompanying text. On the failure to
notice how the structure of bankruptcy discharge can change borrowers’ incentives, see
supra note 125 and accompanying text. See also Hallinan, supra note 70, at 65 (“As the
‘typical’ bankrupt thus shifted from merchant to wage earner, the rationale of the
discharge as an entrepreneurial incentive tended to lose its force and the incentive
structure established under that rationale became increasingly problematic. Yet, while
there was certainly no shortage of commentary directed to the apparent mismatch
between law and policy, the basic legal structure and most of the details of the ‘fresh
start’ remained unchanged until the years shortly before the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.”).
166. “U.S. and English bankruptcy law went very separate ways during the course
of the nineteenth century. English lawmakers adopted a heavily administrative system,
which positions an official receiver between debtors and the possibility of a discharge.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, by contrast, left much of the U.S. process to the parties
themselves.” SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; see also Douglas, supra
note 112, at 332–33.
167. As discussed, individuals underestimate the costs of borrowing since they are
affected by different cognitive mistakes, which undermine their ability to correctly
assess the risks hidden behind a financial decision. See supra Part IV.D.
168. See supra Part IV.C.
169. It is a well understood principle of law-and-economics that when the default
rule is “no liability,” individuals tend not to exercise any care, for doing so would entail
costs without producing any benefit to them. Furthermore, in the absence of liability,
economic analysis of law has shown that individuals engage in a certain activity (e.g.,
borrowing money) to too great an extent since they do not have to subtract costs from
the utility deriving from the activity. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179,195 (2004).
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Progressive scholars seem to have disregarded the possibility that
the very same institution of bankruptcy discharge that they perceive as a
fundamental safety net for the American lower-middle class may
translate, when shaped in a very liberal fashion, into a powerful stimulus
for cognitive mistakes that ultimately cause over-indebtedness.
Extending automatic discharge to any over-indebted could eventually
impair the very same individuals that discharge intends to protect while
spurring the profitability of the financial industry.
This profound split between the original rationale behind
bankruptcy discharge (protecting the honest but unfortunate debtor) and
its modern version (protecting any over-indebted individual) seems
justified only if the mistakes of borrowers cannot be cured or
corrected170 because only then would it make sense to treat the rationally
bounded debtor as an unfortunate person whose over-indebtedness was
not due to negligence.171 A large contingent of bankruptcy scholars has
embraced this latter approach:
Blackstone did not understand that the bankruptcy discharge is a way
of protecting individuals from themselves: it effectively shields them
from consequences of the choice they make. Over time, the
bankruptcy discharge has evolved away from the assumption that
individuals act completely rationally. We no longer must show that
our troubles arose because of something other than our own bad
decisions. We no longer have to be both honest and unfortunate to
172
obtain a fresh start.

Essentially, U.S. bankruptcy law seems to embrace the strongly
paternalistic view that discharge must apply indiscriminately to any
over-indebted borrower for the simple reason that individuals must be
protected from themselves. This, in turn, brings paradoxical legal
consequences. For example, from the moment individuals enter into a
loan agreement, they are treated as legally and mentally capable.
Therefore, the contract is considered valid. Nonetheless, when the
accrued level of debt becomes excessive, the same individual that was
treated as legally capable is then considered to be a rationally bounded
170. According to Hallinan, cognitive biases “are not particularly amenable to
correction, whether by training, education, or even experience.” Supra note 70, at 134.
171. See id. at 127.
172. Baird, supra note 100, at 24–25. These words are in stark contrast to the words
delivered by an English judge in 1810. See Brown’s Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 158, 159–60
(La. 1810); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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victim of that individual’s own faulty decision-making process, thereby
excusing that individual from any consequences related to the valid loan
agreement.
The paradoxical nature of this progressive policy becomes even
more pronounced when one accepts that such liberal access to automatic
discharge intensifies borrowers’ cognitive mistakes, deepening the very
same problem of over-indebtedness that discharge is intended to cure.
These limitations show the failure to consider the difference between
individuals affected by bounded rationality and those who lack the legal
and mental capacity to enter into a valid contract (i.e., minors or the
mentally ill). The former group is able to learn from their cognitive
mistakes while the latter, as a matter of law, is not.
On a hypothetical spectrum with the strong, paternalistic approach
of expansive discharge on one end and the strong, libertarian one that
entirely denies access to discharge and holds debtors fully liable for
their actions on the other, it is possible to envision, somewhere in the
middle, sound legal prescriptions that are able to protect deserving overindebted individuals without making discharge a further incentive for
irresponsible behavior.173 To inhibit the natural human tendency toward
over-indebtedness—in other words, to induce borrowers to take on an
efficient level of debt—the costs of borrowing must be made more
visible so that individuals consider those costs when making decisions.
While imposing mandatory, supply-side regulation to increase
transparency174 may partly achieve this goal, discharge should be shaped
to make borrowers (the demand side) more careful in their financial
decisions.
In order to correct cognitive mistakes, it seems fundamental that
individuals are aware that they will be held liable for their activity or to
put it differently, that they internalize the costs of borrowing, knowing
173. In the past decade, many scholars have written about the possibility of framing
regulation that is able to correct cognitive mistakes, and steer people’s choices in
directions that will improve their welfare without jeopardizing their freedom. On this
line of reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003); Colin Camerer et al.,
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003). For a recent skeptical position on
“libertarian paternalism,” see Lauren E. Willis, When Nudge Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2013).
174. This is the prescription commonly suggested by progressive bankruptcy
scholars. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 139, at 157; Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,
supra note 6, at 1419–20.
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that their cognitive mistakes will not be forgiven. Despite the largely
failed attempts to train people through financial education programs to
“debias” their decision-making,175 denying discharge where the overindebtedness resulted from negligence may vividly and effectively
remind borrowers of the need to account for all costs and possible
consequences deriving from their financial decisions.
Restoring the original foundation of bankruptcy discharge (the
protection of the honest but unfortunate debtor) by reinstating personal
liability (the equivalent of civil law’s universal patrimonial liability)176
for over-indebtedness resulting from negligence and not an exogenous
shock would set the right balance between protecting fragile borrowers
and creating a structure of incentives that would induce borrowers make
more prudent financial choices.177
B. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE AS A REMEDY FOR THE UNFORTUNATE
DEBTOR: INSIGHTS FROM EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
An analysis of the prescriptions for bankruptcy discharge that some
European legal systems have adopted offers important corroborative
evidence for the ex ante perspective that this Article suggests.

175. See Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV.
429, 430 (2011).
176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.
177. For an effective illustration of how the possibility of incurring negative
consequences makes individuals more aware of the costs of their actions, see IAN
AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS
DONE passim (2010); see also Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, The Rise of
Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2013). The need to make
bankruptcy discharge a non-automatic process has been stressed by the founder of the
progressive bankruptcy school: William O. Douglas. Yet, his own disciples, who
considered it “un-American,” disregarded his proposal. See Skeel, Progressive
Bankruptcy Scholarship, supra note 24, at 1110, 1085 (“Douglas strongly believed that
many debtors could avoid financial distress if they were encouraged to manage their
affairs more carefully. Several of Douglas’s proposals sought, in overtly instrumental
fashion, to shape future debtors’ behavior. . . . Douglas, like many legal realists, was a
fervent advocate of judicial and administrative discretion. In his discussion of
speculation and gambling, for instance, Douglas insisted: ‘[An] attempt to treat all cases
of speculation and gambling categorically would be absurd. It would seem desirable,
however, to provide administrators with discretionary power so as to take cognizance of
the variants among the cases.’”).
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1. England
It is worth mentioning English bankruptcy law first, which until the
nineteenth century, has inspired the evolution of U.S. bankruptcy law.178
In 2007, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act introduced the
“Debt Relief Order” procedure, which applies to debtors who have few
or no assets.179 According to Schedule 4A[2 (2) of the Insolvency Act,
the official receiver (a role similar to the one discharged in the United
States by the Bankruptcy Trustee) can ask the court to issue a
Bankruptcy Restriction Order, which effectively imposes upon the
debtor, for anywhere from two to fifteen years,180 the same restrictions
normally applied during the twelve-month bankruptcy period.181 The
receiver may request this if the receiver considers the debtor to have
acted in one of the following ways:
(g) trading at a time before commencement of the bankruptcy when
the bankrupt knew or ought to have known that he was himself to be
unable to pay his debts; (h) incurring, before commencement of the
bankruptcy, a debt which the bankrupt had no reasonable expectation
of being able to pay; (j) carrying on any gambling, rash and
hazardous speculation or unreasonable extravagance which may
have materially contributed to or increased the extent of the
bankruptcy or which took place between presentation of the petition
182
and commencement of the bankruptcy.

Even if the Bankruptcy Restriction Order does not prevent
discharge, it is important to observe that English bankruptcy law
distinguishes not only between the honest, unfortunate debtor and the
fraudulent debtor but also between the former and the
negligent/reckless, over-optimistic debtor who took on debt that he had
no reasonable expectation of repaying.183 The Order applies not only
when the debtor acted opportunistically but also when he “ought to have
178.
179.

See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2.
See Insolvency Act of 1986, c. 45, sch. 4A, § 4(2) (Eng.) modified by the
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007.
180. Id.
181. Such restrictions include the inability to assume new debts or carry on business
(directly or indirectly) in a different name from the one used while becoming bankrupt.
See id. § 360.
182. See Schedule 4A[2 (2) Insolvency Act 1986 as amended by the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
183. Adrian Walters, Personal Insolvency Law After the Enterprise Act: An
Appraisal, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 65 (2005).

338

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

known that he was himself to be unable to pay his debts,” meaning that
he will suffer the consequences of his cognitive errors that resulted in
financial bad decisions.
2. Denmark and Sweden
Scandinavian legal systems are other examples of bankruptcy
prescriptions based on an ex ante perspective. Danish bankruptcy law,
as amended in 2005, provides that in order to grant the discharge to an
over-indebted consumer, the court must carefully consider the causes
behind the over-indebtedness.184 Furthermore, the court must deny the
debtor’s proposed debt adjustment plan and therefore the debtor’s ability
to obtain discharge, upon a finding that the debtor behaved in a
financially irresponsible way. The denial of discharge must be made in
cases where a considerable debt was incurred when the debtor (1) was
unable to meet the financial obligations, or (2) undertook a financial risk
disproportionate to the debtor’s financial situation.185 Accordingly,
Danish bankruptcy law not only denies discharge in cases of fraudulent
or opportunistic behaviour, but also when an over-optimistic consumer
acting in good faith took on a disproportionate amount of debt.
Swedish law follows the Danish logic, requiring that an
independent administrative agency assess the reasonableness of the debt
adjustment plan. In 2006, the Swedish Supreme Court stated that the
administrative agency must deny access to a debt adjustment plan when
the over-indebtedness resulted from speculative behavior and the
consumer undertook a disproportionate risk.186
The Scandinavian ex ante approach aims at preventing the option of
bankruptcy discharge from supplying a reason to underestimate the cost
of debt and make unreasonably risky decisions.187

184. See DANISH BANKRUPTCY LAW Konkurslov (Part IV, Gaeldssanering § 197,
paragraph 2).
185. See id.
186. Jason J. Kilborn, Out With the New, In With the Old: As Sweden Aggressively
Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the
Learning Curve?, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2007).
187. See supra Part IV.D.
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3. Italy
The Italian legal system recently followed this Scandinavian
approach by introducing its first consumer bankruptcy law at the end of
2012.188 Pursuant to Article 12-bis, paragraph 3 of Italian Law No.
3/2012, the court must deny access to the debt adjustment plan proposed
by the consumer upon a finding that the debt was incurred without a
reasonable prospect of repayment. The court must also reject the
proposal if it finds that the debtor disproportionately relied on consumer
credit, and therefore negligently incurred over-indebtedness.189
The Court, after having verified that the debt adjustment is feasible .
. . , approves the plan when it excludes that the consumer has
undertaken obligations without having a reasonable possibility to
discharge them or has negligently caused his over-indebtedness, also
through relying on credit that was not proportional to his patrimonial
capacity . . . .

4. Comparing the Bankruptcy Laws of Denmark, Sweden, and Italy to
the United States
Unlike U.S. bankruptcy law, which allows discharge for any overindebted person,190 the Scandinavian and Italian developments
effectively restore the original foundation of discharge.191 In the latter
legal systems, the paradigmatic “honest but unfortunate” debtor who
took on a sustainable level of debt that later turned into pathological
debt due to an independent, exogenous shock is back at the center of the
bankruptcy procedure.
The deep split between these European
prescriptions and contemporary American bankruptcy law is
immediately apparent when one juxtaposes the former with the words of
188. See Law No. 3 of January 27, 2012, which was later amended by Law Decree
No. 179 of October 18, 2012 (also amended by Law No. 221 of December 17, 2012).
189. Article 12-bis, paragraph 3, Law No. 3/2012: “Verificata la fattibilità del piano
e l’idoneità dello stesso ad assicurare il pagamento dei crediti impignorabili, nonché dei
crediti di cui all’articolo 7, comma 1, terzo periodo, e risolta ogni altra contestazione
anche in ordine all’effettivo ammontare dei crediti, il giudice, quando esclude che il
consumatore ha assunto obbligazioni senza la ragionevole prospettiva di poterle
adempiere ovvero che ha colposamente determinato il sovraindebitamento, anche per
mezzo di un ricorso al credito non proporzionato alle proprie capacità patrimoniali,
omologa il piano, disponendo per il relativo provvedimento una forma idonea di
pubblicità.”
190. See supra Part III.
191. See supra Part II.A.
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Douglas Baird: “we no longer must show that our troubles arose because
of something other than our own bad decisions. We no longer have to
be both honest and unfortunate to obtain a fresh start.”192 The ex ante
perspective of some European countries aims at avoiding the fraudulent
and opportunistic behaviors that are the main concern of law-andeconomics scholars193 as well as the exacerbation of consumers’
irrational tendency toward over-indebtedness.
The notion that an individual must prove misfortune or the absence
of negligence in order to benefit from discharge does not reflect any
punitive agenda toward the reckless debtor. Instead, making the costs of
borrowing more visible would create the right incentives for individuals
to correct cognitive mistakes.194 Once discharge is exclusively granted
to the unfortunate debtor, this legal device would cease to exacerbate the
problem of over-indebtedness and would reinstate its function as social
insurance, whereby only specific risk and not mere financial distress is
protected. Once bankruptcy discharge is understood as social insurance,
a “private” safety net aimed at protecting honest but “unfortunate”
individuals, it could be argued that the scope of this measure should be
graduated according to the extent of the functionally alternative,
“public” social welfare policies. Following this line of reasoning, it
would be reasonable to argue that since the scope of the welfare state in
Europe—notwithstanding the current austerity measures—is still
significant, discharge should be limited to confined cases, whereas in the
United States, in light of its limited welfare state, discharge might be
applied more broadly.195
CONCLUSION
The reasoning that this Article advances on the problem of
consumer bankruptcy, which is also supported by recent trends in some
European legal systems, reveals the limits of both sides of the highly
ideological debate that characterizes U.S. bankruptcy scholarship. The
conservative position relies upon an unrealistic law-and-economics
analysis in supporting the BAPCPA reform, which was not intended to
limit bankruptcy discharge, but rather to enhance financial industry
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Baird, supra note 100, at 25.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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profits. Meanwhile, at the other extreme, progressive scholars entirely
neglect to account for the maladaptive incentives that discharge creates
for borrowers.
The first paradox that this study unveils is that the very same
remedy that pro-debtor scholars intensely defend as an essential safety
net for the American lower-middle class is also a powerful incentive for
over-indebtedness, and therefore a means of profit for lenders when that
policy is shaped in overly liberal terms. The 2008 financial crisis
illustrates the perils of too much debt and how individuals tend to
underestimate those perils. To truly protect borrowers, these credit
market failures must be addressed by both more strictly regulating the
supply side of credit and reshaping discharge to encourage borrowers to
correct their cognitive mistakes.
This Article also reconsiders the conventional wisdom that assigns
a pro-creditor connotation to the civil law tradition, founded on the
principle of debtors’ universal patrimonial liability, while labeling as
pro-debtor the common law tradition, which characterizes for a liberal
regime of bankruptcy discharge.
A second paradox emerges when observing discharge through the
lens of behavioral law and economics. The tendency toward overindebtedness and the consequential vulnerability of borrowers and
prosperity of the financial industry are much more pronounced in
common law regimes, where debtors are considered to be more strongly
protected. On the other hand, the civil law systems, which have
historically adopted a less debtor-friendly approach to discharge, and are
therefore conventionally considered more favorable to creditors, are
characterized by more sound, financially solid borrowing practices and a
less expansive supply of consumer credit, both of which help to insulate
consumers from potentially disastrous debt.
Based on these conclusions, this Article argues that U.S.
bankruptcy law should be revised to only protect the honest, unfortunate
debtor similar to the bankruptcy laws in England, Denmark, Sweden,
and Italy. This would help to correct biases and heuristics, which would
discourage over-indebtedness.

